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ABSTRACT: This article aims to discuss the possibility of constitutional changes coming from 
the International Human Rights Law, both by virtue of decisions issued in the International Courts 
when the State has expressed adhesion, as by the international norms freely covenanted in the 
scenario of the international society, ratifying and internalizing them.  There is a legal duty to 
conform internal norms to international standards for the protection of human rights, and such a 
duty can be carried out through constitutional change or through direct amendment of legal texts, 
including the constitutional text. For this purpose, what is proposed here is the adoption of a 
universalist and supranormative vision of human rights, aided by the control of conventionality of 
norms and by the abandonment of the classical view of sovereignty. 
 
Palavras-chave: International Human Rights Law. Supranormative. Sovereignty. Conventionality 
Control. Judicial Review. 
 
RESUMO: O presente artigo pretende discutir a possibilidade de modificações na Constituição 
Brasileira a partir do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, tanto em virtude de decisões 
emitidas nas Cortes Internacionais às quais o Estado tenha manifestado adesão, quanto pelas 
normas internacionais que livremente pactuou no cenário da sociedade internacional, ratificando e 
internalizando-as. Existe um dever jurídico de conformação das normas internas aos padrões 
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internacionais de proteção aos direitos humanos, e tal dever pode ser levado à cabo por meio da 
mutação constitucional ou por alteração direta de textos legais, incluindo o texto constitucional. 
Para tanto, o que se propõe aqui é a adoção de uma visão universalista e supranormativa dos direitos 
humanos, auxiliadas pelo controle de convencionalidade das normas e pelo abandono da visão 
clássica de soberania. 
 
Keywords: Direito Internacional dos Direitos humanos. Supranormatividade, Soberania. Controle 
de Convencionalidade. Judicial Review. 
 
SUMÁRIO: Introduction. 1.  The sovereignty and its relationship with the International Human 
Rights Law. 2. The fundamental rights of the human rights. 3. The supranormativity of The 
International Human Rights Law. 4. International Courts decisions striving for State’s legislative 
changes: case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights, and Olmedo Bustos 





The International Law of Human Rights is a reality, especially after the United Nation`s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This body of norms has essential importance to 
the civilization, because it appears as one of the most important bulwark on the protection of the 
rights universally recognized, which are necessary and primary to the preservation of the human 
beings. 
At first, founded on an extremely nationalist and defensive of the internal sovereignty 
view, the countries of the international society used to defend that the international body of norms 
would not be enforceable, but only suggestive, enhancing, thus, the so called “dualist theory” of 
the international law, which claims the independence and distinction that exists between the 
international law and the internal legal order of the States. 
Kelsen, in turn, from a “monist theory”, defended the existence of a single legal order with 
projections both within the internal and international level, and because of that, due to the lack of 
duality between internal and international laws, the internalization of the subject of international 
treaties would occur automatically (ARAÚJO, 2016). 
 In the light of this new “monist” concept, it is worth saying, which defends the dialecticism 
and uniformity of the international legal order with the legal order of the countries, the international 
society began to accept more often the interference of the rules of international Law on a humanist 
vision, directed at the concretion of “fundamental human rights1”. A great example of this is the 
creation of international/regional courts for the protection of human rights, such as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (ACHR), which has a real inspection function on the observing 
the international rules. 
 Despite the clear evolution of the mentioned symbiosis, there are still questions that need 
to be solved regarding the regulatory force of the international law in the context of the internal 
legal order of the countries, for example: 1) what will be the regulatory status of human rights 
standards in the country’s internal legal order? 2) is it possible that, in the case of conflict/collision 
between the rules of international law and the rules of a country’s internal legal order, the first ones 
overlap with the second, even if these are endowed with constitutional status? 
 In the case of Brazil, the answer to the first question can be indicated under two facets. 
Under the current forecast of the 1988 Federal Constitution, notably in article 5, § 2 and § 3 
                                                          
1  The recognition of the existence of other normative diplomas with constitutional status outside the Constitution 
corresponding to what has been termed the "constitutionality block" (RAMOS, 2017, p. 537). 
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(included by constitutional amendment n. 45/2004), international treaties and conventions on 
human rights will be assimilated to constitutional status standards, provided that they have been 
approved, in each house of the National Congress, in two shifts, by three-fifths of the votes of the 
respective members. A contrario sensu, the treaties and conventions which do not comply with the 
above formal requirement, or which do not be about human rights, will not be endowed with 
constitutional status, but, as the current understanding of the Supreme Federal Court2, bears a 
“supra-legality” character, it is worth saying, are below the Constitution, but are superior to 
ordinary laws. 
 The second question presented, in turn, constitutes the problem of research in this article, 
whose positioning, in anticipation, advocates the possibility that standards of international law on 
human rights and decisions of International Courts to which countries – and, more specifically, 
Brazil – have adhered to, have not only mandatory observance and jurisdiction, but are also fully 
capable of amending internal legislation that is in disagreement with its guidelines, even the 
constitutional norms. 
 The work is divided into four chapters. In the first it presents a contemporary view of 
sovereignty, more appropriate to the reality of human rights, including showing that the accession 
of States to the treaties, pacts and declarations of international rights is the purest manifestation of 
sovereignty. It also points out that such standards and even decisions emanating from International 
Courts to which the States have freely adhered are important manifestations that complement the 
seriousness democratic and affirmative of the basic principles of humanity by them.  
 The second chapter addresses a vision that goes from fundamental rights to human rights 
and chooses the indistinct use of the terms or even its joint use (fundamental human rights) as well 
as the supra-normative conceptualization of such rights, because the human rights, contemporarily 
designated, arise from the evolution and expansion of the very notion of fundamental rights, 
produced within the States, with the historical march of claiming for rights and achieving 
universalization under the auspices of the International Human Rights Law, topic analyzed deeper 
in the third chapter. 
 The fourth chapter briefly analyses two paradigmatic decisions that have provided 
important legislative changes (and even constitutional reforms) in other States, to substantiate the 
position here also adopted in international jurisprudence – the cases “X” and “Y” vs. Holland 
(European Court of Human Rights) and Olmedo Bustos vs. Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ 
– Inter-American Court of Human Rights).  
After all the proposed analysis, the conclusion is that the disregard for the norms with 
supra-normative content, characteristics of those that compose the International Law of Human 
Rights to which States have, according to what their constitution prescribes, demonstrated 
acquiescence, is equivalent to the disrespecting for the dignity of the human person, which, in the 
Brazilian case, is the foundation of the Republic, according to express constitutional disposition. 
For this reason, it impels the powers of the States to the adaption with to international standards of 
human rights that freely have agreed. 
  
                                                          
2 MAZZUOLI strongly criticizes the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, because in his view: "For many years we 
have defended that the international human rights treaties incorporated into the Brazilian legal order have constitutional 
status, independently of a majority in the National Congress, simply because we understand that such instruments have 
an ethical foundation that goes beyond any power that the State may have - in its reserved domain - to allocate them 
to previously defined "levels". Hence we have always understood that the only "level" that could have an international 
instrument of this nature, that is, that conveys human rights norms, was the level of constitutional norms, precisely 
because the latter are the highest ones within the scale hierarchy of the domestic legal order (2009, p. 1). 
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1 THE SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The classical notion of sovereignty dates from the sixteenth century, and the book “Les 
Six Livres de la République” (1576), Jean Bodin, has been doctrinally considered as the first 
readership to deal with the modern concept of sovereignty. Dalmo Dallari assumes that sovereignty 
is still seen as synonymous with independence, or as an expression of “the highest legal power” 
(2015, p. 90). In the Objection 11243 addressed to the Brazilian Supreme Court (Italian Republic 
v. President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, by reason of the extradition request of Cesare 
Battisti), was briefed that:  
 
The National Sovereignty at the transnational level is based on the principle of 
national independence, carried out by the President of the Republic as the chief 
executive officer responsibilities under the art. 84, VII and VIII, of The Highest 
Law. The sovereignty, dichotomized into internal and external, has in the former 
the first manifestation of the popular will (Article 14 of the CRFB), through the 
people's representatives in parliament and government; in the latter, its expression 
at the international level through the President.  
 
Now, if we assume that the internal sovereignty weights on the popular will expressed by 
the people’s representatives in the parliament and government, and the external one is guided by 
the acts of the one who holds the position of President of the Republic. Besides, starting from the 
principle that in our representative democracy such position is filled by the popular majority vote, 
it’s the President of the Republic the one who obviously binds the State to that which he/she 
deliberately and freely covenanted with the international society. With greater reason (by virtue of 
articles 1º, III, 3º, I, 4º II, 5º, §§ 2º e 3º of CF3/88 and article 7 of ADCT), all the international 
regulations about human rights, as well as every decision of International Courts that Brazil has 
expressed support should be linked to the State, (p.ext. internally). After all, if our President ratified 
an act, by the principle of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda, the State must comply it. Here, 
however, it is important to record that the President of the Republic is the head of State and formally 
held a primary competence unrelated to these issues, or the role played by the Legislative Power 
also assumes special relevance, especially when analyzed its function of correction, aprovation / 
validation and supervision according to the theory of “checks and balances”. 
Nowadays there is a dense international normative set of human protection, started as a 
strong movement from The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Examples on sight 
are treaties and agreements formulated and ratified by States, including Brazil, weighing upon 
positivization and the universalization of a series of rights, creation of means of investigating 
human rights violations (through UN, Inter-American, European and African Courts), as well as 
determination of individual responsibilities for human rights violations (International Criminal 
Court) and rights recognized as being common to all mankind from the core values of human 
dignity. These days, as well asserts André de Carvalho Ramos, it is no longer appropriate to any 
State to claim the: 
 
[…] rights of human protection as part of its reserved area” and that “eventual 
international investigation (even the minimal ones) of a given internal situation 
of human rights would offend the State sovereignty. (RAMOS, 2015, p. 123). 
 
On their own, States can accept or not international standards; joining or not some 
international intergovernmental organizations. This is itself the strongest expression of 
sovereignty. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the case S.S. Wimbledon 
                                                          
3 CF – Constituição Federal (Federal Constitution) 
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(judgment on 17 August 1923)4 made clear that the agreement on treaties is one of the most 
important acts of sovereignty by a given State. 
By denying and violating fundamental human rights, the State cannot supposedly use the 
excuse of sovereignty. In this sense, David Held (2003, p. 169) believes that sovereignty is the 
political power delimited by a global basis. 
The global basis refered by Held should be the International Human Rights Law. 
Therefrom, it’s critical to set forth an interpretation of the national law in the light of the 
Constitution and international human rights standards. This can be done when applying what André 
de Carvalho Ramos names “jusfundamentalization of law” or “jusfundamental filtering”, which 
exhorts that laws should be suitable with human rights (RAMOS, 2015, p. 371). Even constitutional 
supremacy undergoes changes, since it must be woven together with the international protection of 
human rights (Ibidem). We can no longer interpret covenanted international treaties freely, from a 
national perspective. 
Albeit the state sovereignty’s meaning comes to an autopoiesis of the politics, and with 
respect to the Rule of Law, an operational autonomy of the legal system (NEVES, 2008, p. 160), 
in fact, it evinces itself – and it is stated in the Constitution – as “the structural coupling between 
politics and law” (Ibidem, p. 161). State sovereignty requires from the The Rule of Law the political 
responsibility for critical global issues, that is a local political responsibility under the structural 
conditions of the world society (Ibidem, p.162). In other words, even the popular sovereignty 
prompts a “continuous insertion of diverse values, interests and requirements present in the 
pluralistic public sphere in the procedures of the Democratic State”, where “political decisions 
(likewise constitutional decisions) and legal standards (including constitutional norms) are based 
on the people’s sovereignty, nonsubjectively and discursively built (democracy).” (Ibidem, p. 165). 
We understand the International Human Rights Law is one of the most relevant factor for the 
pluralistic public sphere, because it sustains the defense of democracy and the most important 
values to the mankind. In this sense, Peter Häberle5, quoted by Alfonso Julios-Campuzano (2009, 
p. 103), endorses the need for a cooperative constitutional State: 
 
[…] firmly committed to the development of its axiological content at the 
international level; a constitutional State model that does not renounce its direct 
implication for the international order and that takes its direct implication for the 
complex web of international relations. 
 
This Cooperative Constitutionalism goes beyond State’s borders and undermines the old 
concept of territorial sovereignty because it is a reachable model of a globalized world – always 
open to changes in an increasingly interdependent world – and running through a “collective 
compromise in an inter and supranational level” (Ibidem). In this sense, the International Human 
Rights Law should also guide this Cooperative Constitutionalism. 
 
2 THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
Nowadays, we see the combination of “human rights” and “fundamental rights” in 
“fundamental human rights” or “fundamental rights of a person” (RAMOS, 2015, p. 51). 
According to André de Carvalho Ramos, the merge of these terms proves that the difference 
between human rights “loses importance, especially in the light of a process of rapprochement and 
mutual relationship between the International Law and the National Law on human rights issues.” 
                                                          
4 Available in: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_01/03_Wimbledon_Arret_08_1923.pdf.   
5 “Estado constitucional cooperativo será pues aquel Estado cuya identidade incluso a nivel internacional se halla 
dentro de un complejo tejido de relaciones inter y supranacionales, así como en la medida en que toma plenamente 
conciencia de la colaboración internacional y se responsabiliza también de ella como parte de la propia solidaridad” 
(JULIOS-CAMPUZANO, 2009, p. 103). 
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(Ibidem, p. 51). The American Convention on Human Rights6 supports the loss of importance of 
the terms’ distinction, given the fact that, currently, human rights have also binding force (due to 
the States’ recognition and submission to international standards), and not only the fundamental 
rights preserved in constitutions and States’ domestic laws.  
In this line, Luigi Ferrajoli (2011, p. 9) proposes a new purely formal – or structural – 
theoretical definition of fundamental rights: 
 
[...] ‘fundamental rights’ are all those subjective legal rights that relate universally 
to ‘all’ human beings as endowed with the person's status, or citizen able to act. I 
understand by ‘subjective right’ any positive expectation (the provision) or 
negative (non-injury) linked to someone by a regulatory framework, and by the 
status of a person`s condition, in its turn, also planned by a positive Rule of law, 
which assumes one`s suitability as the holder of legal situations and/or the author 
of the acts in process. 
 
Among the theses listed by FERRAJOLI (Ibidem, p. 16) for his formal/structural 
definition of fundamental rights, the one that stands out to the subject of this paper is the 
supranational nature of most of the fundamental rights. Many of these are: 
 
[...] (fundamental rights) conferred by state constitutions regardless of citizenship. 
Especially because, after the formulation in international conventions received by 
state constitutions or in any form received by States, the fundamental rights 
become supranational rights: external and not only internal limits to the public 
authorities and the regulatory basis of an international democracy – far away of 
being active, but normatively prefigured by these rights. 
 
Apparently, Luigi Ferrajoli treats supranational fundamental rights as part of the 
International Human Rights Law, which validates the importance of not making a distinction 
between the terminologies “human rights” and “fundamental rights.” The human rights, 
contemporarily designed, arise from the evolution and expansion of the fundamental rights notion 
produced within States alongside with the march for establishing human right claims. 
Samuel Moyn, supporting the thesis that human rights have been through a paradigmatic 
shift since The Onusiana Declaration of 1948. States that we don’t even know whether the people 
who talked about human rights in the 40’s had in mind the creation of supranational types of 
authority that scaffolds human rights today. Futhermore, the author affirms that: 
  
The victorious ideology of World War II, in fact, was what I would call “national 
welfarism” — the commitment to update the terms of nineteenthcentury 
citizenship to include social protection, an obligation that was unfailingly 
undertaken within the terms of the nation. It was no accident that it was precisely 
in this era that the nation-state globalized and finally, after centuries, became the 
dominant political form of humanity. If human rights were resonant at all, it was 
as one synonym for the sorts of new entitlements States would offer their 
citizens: hence the Universal Declaration’s self-description as a “common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations (MOYN, 2014, p. 58). 
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Rights are not recognized as favors from States or economic and political elite: they are 
conquered by countless human sacrifices7, public opnion and social movements, as well as by the 
action of the economic, political and even the military forces, which, positively or negatively, were 
also ccrucial into their recognition. The struggle for human rights is a fight for good reason. It is a 
fight for the preservation of the people, all of the people, not just a few individuals or a small part 
of the society. Hannah Arendt (in LAFER, 1998, p. 153) says that human rights are a “constructed”, 
an invention linked to the organization of the political community. 
 
3 THE SUPRANORMATIVITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
 The certainty of the human rights era is that the man itself constitutes the world for the man, 
in the sense that he is somehow concrete. “Man does not exist because of the law but rather the law 
exists for the good of man” (MARX, 2014, p. 56). This is why we can talk about the human 
existence. People keep building. Human rights are daily builds; they are achievements in a 
continuous movement of progressive advances and reactionary attacks. 
The major Marxist critique on the Law emphasizes that it is composed of an upper class 
nature, whose use of generalized commodity exchange requires, for its effectiveness, the 
emergence of the legal subjectivity of the principles of freedom and equality which come along 
with Law (ENGELS & KAUTSKY, 2012, p. 11-12), where “a person exists only as a 
representative of the merchandise one has, that is, where one becomes a representative commodity 
of oneself” (EDELMAN, 1976, p. 95). This reasoning places the individual as the alienation`s 
owner from the self. In spite of that, we believe Human Rights are of another ilk: “they are the 
essential rights and indispensable to a decent life.” (Ramos, 2015: 27). Indeed, human rights have 
resulted from revolutionary fights, oftentimes violent8. 
When it comes to Human Rights, Kant’s imperative echo is clear: another person should 
not be treated “as simply a means to another end” (KANT, 1983, p. 36). Following the Holocaust, 
there is the creation of a particular kind of space, the ‘camp’, where people were defined as having 
lives not worth living, and as being vulnerable to being killed with impunity and with no law 
(AGAMBEN, 2015, p. 44). HABERMAS (2012a, p. 10), in the meantime, questions whether it is 
in The World War II’s aftermath that the idea of human rights is then morally charged with the 
concept of human dignity. For him, the answer is no, because “the appeal to human rights feeds off 
the outrage of the humiliated at the violation of their human dignity” (HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 75) 
that has ever existed. The author speaks of human dignity as a universal concept because outrage 
is what informs a demand for rights, therefore, dignity works as a catalyst in the composition of 
human rights. Habermas states that “the background intuition of humiliation forces its way first 
into consciousness of suffering individuals and then into legal texts, where it finds conceptual 
articulation and elaboration”as new human rights (HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 78). 
After all, the overarching goal of human rights is the achievement and maintenance of 
human beings’ basic rights, and this can only be set out from the universality of human rights, yet 
built on diversity. HABERMAS (2012a, p. 29-30) ponders that universalist claims of human rights 
can only be redeemed in an all-encompassing cosmopolitan community, in a democratically 
established world society. Regardless of world government, democratic living governance is 
paramount wherefore simple and harmonious coexistence – attatched to fundamental human rights 
– expands upon the raison d’être of denying value superiority between different existing cultures.  
                                                          
7  When dealing with the struggle of black Americans for the conquest of civil rights and the resulting sacrifices, ZIIN 
(2007, p. 76) affirms that: “White segregationists turned to violence. They exploded bombs in four black churches. 
They fired a shotgun through the front door of the home of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., a minister who helped lead the 
boycott. But the black people of Montgomery kept up the boycott, and in November 1956the Supreme Court made 
segregation on local bus line illegal”. 
8 It must be clarified here that it is not being stated that the basis of human rights established in the post second war is 
based on Marxism, but only that Marx, in his readings, was already aware about those issues.. 
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In this regard, it was the internationalization of human rights the first step towards the idea 
of human rights universalization9. Consequently, the concept of universal human rights brings out 
the idea of supranormativity of The International Human Rights Law, since human rights break 
through national borders however shielded by international protection. That said, we can only 
witness this process by nurturing the implementation and massification of international human 
rights assumption. In order to ensure a real protection to human beings, both domestic and 
international law should not be allocated on a Tower of Babel. 
According to the “Dialogue between Courts10,” courts and legislatures participate in a 
dialogue aimed at achieving the dual control of national standards (internal 
constitutionality/internal conventionality and external conventionality11), and the suitability of 
domestic legislation to treaties and pacts dealt by States are the utmost measures that resulted from 
the human rights supranormativity. The normative superiority of Human Rights stems mostly from 
a jus cogens orientation, which takes laws related to Human Rights beyond their mandatory nature, 
onto a revoking impossibility thereof based only on particular wills. André de Carvalho Ramos 
prelects:  
 
In international law, the absolute norm in the strict sense (also called peremptory 
norm or jus cogens norm) is the one that contains essential values for the 
international community as a whole, and therefore has normative superiority 
compared to other rules of International Law. 
Hence, if a legal norm fits the jus cogens category, it does not mean it’s a 
mandatory one, forasmuch as all of the international norms are mandatory: it 
means that, apart from mandatory, peremptory norm can not be changed by the 
will of a State. (RAMOS, 2015, p. 184-185) 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that a peremptory norm of 
general International Law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and the modification can be perpetrated only by a 
subsequent norm of general international rights of the same nature (Ibidem, p. 185). According to 
Norberto Bobbio,   
 
With the 1948 Declaration [...] the assertion of rights is, at the same time, universal 
and positive: universal in the sense that the recipients of the principles contained 
therein are not only citizens of this or that State, but all men; positive in that it sets 
out a motion process whose human rights must be not only proclaimed or just 
ideally recognized. Although, they are effectively protected even against the State 
                                                          
9 Accordingly, RAMOS argues that: “Universality was regained with the internationalization of fundamental rights " 
(2015, p. 207). 
10 The dialogue between Cortes is not a new, as it is recognized by several authors and in other countries: 1) Paraguai: 
SALGUEIRO, Jorge Silvero. Paraguay: diálogo entre Tribunales Nacionales e Internacionales. In: MEZZETI, Luca; 
CONCI, Luiz Guilherme Arcaro (Coords.). Diálogo entre cortes: a jurisprudência nacional e internacional como fator 
de aproximação de ordens jurídicas em um mundo cosmopolita. Brasília: OAB, Conselho Federal, 2015; 2) Reino 
Unido: Cf. FROSINI, Justin O. The domestic Law of the United Kingdom and Internacional and European Law: An 
ever more tense relationship. In: MEZZETI, Luca; CONCI, Luiz Guilherme Arcaro (Coords.). Diálogo entre cortes: 
a jurisprudência nacional e internacional como fator de aproximação de ordens jurídicas em um mundo cosmopolita. 
Brasília: OAB, Conselho Federal, 2015; e 3) Argentina: AMAYA, Jorge Alejandro. El diálogo inter-jurisdiccional 
entre tribunales extranjeros e internos como nueva construcción de las deciones judiciales. In:  MEZZETI, Luca; 
CONCI, Luiz Guilherme Arcaro (Coords.). Diálogo entre cortes: a jurisprudência nacional e internacional como fator 
de aproximação de ordens jurídicas em um mundo cosmopolita. Brasília: OAB, Conselho Federal, 2015. 
11 As CAMILO (2017, p. 24) points out, in discussing the importance and the current relevance of convention control, 
due to the recognition of the normativity of international law in the internal ordering of countries, there was a paradigm 
shift in the vertical control of norms so that "compatibility in the legal system becomes not only according to the 
Constitution, but it gains a new parameter of adequacy, what are the human rights standards adopted at the international 
level, and this new form of vertical control of the legal rules" (Free Translation). 
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itself, whatever it violates them. At the end of this process, the citizens’ rights will 
really have become, positively, on human rights. (BOBBIO, 2004, p. 29-30) 
 
This scenario is only possible due to an ongoing change of mind (progressist) of humanity. 
Notwithstanding, there are side effects, such as setbacks and reactionary attacks provoked by those 
who persist in believing the world to be a backyard of their territories and wills. Crises cast out 
feelings that evoke alternative paradigms wrapped up in protection against human woes; such 
paradigms, that aim to protect people’s dignity, are human rights – now, internationalized and 
supranormative12. 
 
4 INTERNATIONAL COURTS DECISIONS STRIVING FOR STATE’S LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES: CASE OF X AND Y V. THE NETHERLANDS, EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OLMEDO BUSTOS ET AL. V. CHILE (“THE LAST 
TEMPTATION OF CHRIST”) - INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The chosen paradigmatic cases deal with convictions enforced by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Both led to internal legislative 
amendments therein the condemned States. 
X and Y v. Netherlands, 26 March 1985, is a case in which a 16-year-old mentally 
handicapped girl (Y) was sexually assaulted by the son-in-law (B) of the director of a privately-
run care home in the early hours of 14 and 15 December 1977, the day after her 16th birthday. 
During the rape, Y had become even more mentally disturbed. Y’s father, Mr. X, reported the rape 
to the Dutch police the day after the facts (16 December 1977). Afterwards, police reported the 
case to the Prosecutor’s Office, where the police officer testified that Y’s was unable to file a 
complaint independently, given her mental status. On 29 May 1978, the public prosecutor decided 
not to open proceedings against B, provided that he did not commit any similar offense within two 
years. Mr. X appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal of Arnhem District, and on 12 
June 1979, Court denied the appeal stating the victims over the age of 16 should lodge complaints 
of crimes themselves and, despite the police statement of Y’s limitations, the law did not say 
whether the father could complain on the child’s behalf. The Court found the protection afforded 
by civil law to be insufficient. However, even considering that fundamental values and essential 
aspects of private life were at stake, they understood that such a gap could not be filled by means 
                                                          
12 See Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica: https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B 
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm.  
Article 1. Obligation to Respect Rights 
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure 
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any 
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, "person" means every human being. 
Article 2. Domestic Legal Effects 
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or 
other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the 
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or 
freedoms. 
According to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
(see http://crossborder.ie/site2015/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/1969-Vienna-Convention-on-the-Law-of-
Treaties.pdf). 
Article 27. Internal law and observance of treaties 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is 
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of extensive interpretation. Then, facing the appeal denial of the State Supreme Court by force of 
Article 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Netherlands, Mr. X reached out European 
Commission of Human Rights (restructured by Protocol 11). 
The European Court on Human Rights, upon receipt of the case, declared that it was the 
State’s duty to adopt appropriate legislative measures to protect people in their fundamental rights 
in the face of violations perpetrated by individuals, claiming violation of rights based upon the 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights13, condemning the State by not providing 
legal measures of filing complaints for sexual offenses by those who are responsible for the victims, 
particularly in the event of vulnerable children being the victims of sexual abuse (i.e. laws 
insufficient for human rights’ protection). Therefore, the Netherlands criminal code was 
inconsistent on this point with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, presenting 
a clear procedural gap in the law in respect of minors and the people with a mental disability, as 
well as whenever neglecting victims and families criminal proceedings. In this case, the State did 
not provide Y with practical and effective protection (KILLANDER, 2010, p. 166). The State was 
formally condemned by the European Court of Human Rights, and was urged to prevent cases of 
this kind, which could only be achieved through criminal law (Ibid). During the hearings, the 
representative of the Netherlands government, in turn, presented a proposal for 
modification/adaptation of domestic legislation14 in this respect. 
The case Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile15 is based on the ban on the showing of the film 
“The Last Temptation of Christ” (Martin Scorcese) by the Cinematographic Classification Council 
(CCC) of Chile in 1988 (year of the film`s release), at the height of the Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
In November 1996, when Chile had already established the democratic regime, the film 
was again submitted to the CCC by its distributors in the country. This time, it was decided to 
licence the film for an audience of 18 years and over. Following the approval in the same month, 
a group of lawyers appealed to the Court of Apelaciones del Chile to prohibit the exhibition of the 
film, and found result. However, in June 1997, the decision was annulled by the Supreme Court. 
Subsequently, in September 1997, another group of lawyers filed a complaint to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in the face of censorship of cinematographic product, alleging 
violation of the American Convention on Human Rights (Chile is a signatory State since 1990). 
Considering that no friendly solution could be reached out, Comission denounced Chile to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 15 January 1999. 
During the public hearing on 18 November 2000, the Commission testified to the Court 
that the ban on the showing of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ” had violated Article 13 of 
the Convention, which determines that the exercise of the right of thought and expression shall not 
be subject to prior censorship. On 5 February 2001, the Court declared that Chile had to adapt their 
laws to the Convention’s principles, resulting in allowing the showing of “The Last Temptation of 
Christ” with no restrictions. Likewise, Chile was found guilty of violating Article 2 of the 
Convention by failing to adapt their domestic law prior to the decision of the Court. Following the 
                                                          
13 See http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
“Right o respect for private and family life” 
1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise  of  this  right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  
with  the  law  and  is  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
14 See http://hudoc.echr.coe.int 
“At the hearings, counsel for the Government informed the Court that the Ministry of Justice had prepared a Bill 
modifying the provisions of the Criminal Code that related to sexual offences. Under the Bill, it would be an offence 
to make sexual advances to a mentally handicapped person”. 
15 See http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_73_ing.pdf 
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outcome, Chile amended Article 19.12 of its Constitution in order to adapt it to the American 
Convention on Human Rights’ doctrine. 
Let us assume both paradigmatic cases (X and Y v. the Netherlands and Olmedo Bustos 
et al. v. Chile) led the signatory States of the Convention on Human Rights (European and 
American) to change their domestic laws. Chile even amended its Constitution. Therefore, it’s 
important to figure out how significant are the International Courts decisions in the field of human 
rights. Beth Simmons, accordingly, claims that the empowerment of human rights discussions on 
within the States emanates from the International Courts, as a result of their effectiveness 
(SIMMONS, 2009, p. 443). When we find States amending domestic legislation to conform to the 
dictates of the International Human Rights Law, then it gets clear the necessary path of 
supranormativity and the strengthening of human rights standards, particularly in democratic 
countries that can no longer shy away from their obligations in this affair by eclipsing behind the 
classic notion of sovereignty. 
André de Carvalho Ramos (2015, p. 373) claims the issue of the internal standard is 
considered the mere fact (i.e. it expresses the will of the State) for the States and the International 
Courts. However, for International Law, domestic acts ought to be compatible with the previous 
international commitments assumed by the States, under penalty of international responsibility. 
The constitutional rule of a State is a mere fact whether it doesn`t entail the international legal norm 
(Ibidem, p. 374). As an example, Brazil does not require homologation of the foreign sentence (as 
provided in the Brazilian Constitution) from international courts that the country is somewhat a 
member due to the international body of law that governs such courts – not being state courts (Ibid, 
p. 375). 
In this regard, the paradigmatic cases discussed in this paper only reinforce these 
positions. Especially in the European Court of Human Rights, there are plenty of cases16 that 
produced internal legislative reforms within the States party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. States party to the Organization of American States acted accordingly17. Brazil, for 
instance, created the so-called “Maria da Penha Law” that punishes domestic violence against 
women after the Inter-American Commission (although not a court) publicly and internationally 
blaming the country for closing its eyes to violence against women; besides, the case Gomes Lund, 
judged by the Inter-American Court, condemned Brazil for crimes committed during the military 
dictatorship (1964-1985). This last case (Gomes Lund) has forced the country to create the National 
Commission of Truth, which aims to investigate serious human rights violations that occurred in 
between 18 September 1946 and 5 October 1988, even though it has so far maintained the legal 
effectiveness of the Amnesty Law (Law Nº. 6683/7918) by decision of the Supreme Court for a 
claim of non-compliance with a fundamental precept (ADPF Nº.153) filed by the Federal Council 
of the Bar Association of Brazil (OAB). In other words, it has enforced the law to conceive 
punishment for criminal acts committed by the agents of political repression during the military 
regime in Brazil; even though the Inter-American Court declared the incompatibility of the 
aforementioned law of amnesty to the principles of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
As set forth herein, the case Olmedo Bustos v. Chile, in our view, is the most emblematic of the 
American Convention on Human Rights to bear out the intrinsic relationship between the 
supranormative nature of human rights and the the International Courts decisions that, ultimately, 
might cause internal legislative changes in the States party to conventions created for the protection 
of human rights. 
                                                          
16 Cases Belgian Linguistics (1968), Marckx (1979), Dudgeon (1981), Norris (1988), Huvig (1990), Motta (1991), 
Assenov (1998), Ciraklar (1998), among others. 
17 Cases Barrios Alto v. Peru (2001), reflecting in legislative changes in Argentina as well, when the Supreme Court 
of this country annulled laws No. 23.492/86 and No. 23521 /87, adopting this trial as precedent; Almonacid Arellano 
(2006), Aguirre Roca and others (2001), among others. 
18 See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L6683.htm 
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At the end of this paper, we drew the conclusion that the States must adapt their national 
legislation to the principles and doctrines of the International Human Rights Law that they freely 
expressed membership, because these are considered international jus cogens rules. Therefore, 
these standards are the true expression of States’ sovereignty because, after all, when a State signs 
a treaty, agreement or convention, and submit itself to the jurisdiction of International Courts, it 
expresses its freely and unequivocally accession. One vision of absolute sovereignty, meanwhile, 
can no longer be used as an excuse for States’ woes and mistakes, since political power is defined 
on a global basis, and such global basis is set out in International Human Rights Law – the one that 
has its core in universal human rights. 
Consequently, it is entirely possible that precepts of International Human Rights Law and 
decisions of International Courts turn out to be the foremost guideline for domestic legislative 
changes. In this sense, it also seems possible that constitutional rules become unconstitutional 
moving forward alongside the approval of human rights treaties or the condemnation of States in 
International Courts, wherefrom norm incompatibility between national and international rules 
emerge as evident.  Such is the case of the Gomes Lund case, judged by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, which condemned Brazil internationally by declaring the incompatibility of the 
Brazilian Amnesty Law of 1976 in defiance of the American Convention on Human Rights. In 
addition, both the rules generated from original or derived Constituent Power can become 
unconstitutional; whether constitutional laws eventually wind up unconstitutional under 
International Human Rights Law, obviously infraconstitutional norms fall into line. 
The adaptation of the domestic laws – the constitutional ones included – in conformity to 
International Human Rights Law can be performed by  direct legislative amendment or judicial 
review19. Likewise, legislative changes can happen by declaration of unconstitutionality and 
inconsistency, by reducing the laws text. At this point, it’s imperative that the Legislative power 
performs the control of conventionality upon the control of constitutionality, promoting the 
“dialogue between the legislatures and the courts”, which should avoid decisions that ultimately 
place the State as nonconformist of international decisions regarding human rights protection. 
As pointed out throughout the paper, there are international paradigms that support the 
vision advocated here (highlighting the cases X and Y v. Netherlands and Olmedo Bustos et al. v. 
Chile), which show that States that have ratified Human Rights Conventions and their international 
jurisdiction, they have the power, but also the duty of suiting the global governance that protects 
universal human rights. In this respect, supranormativity urges that all the Legal Order is 
interpreted from a human rights perspective. Thus, a fail to comply with rules of supranormative 
standards is equivalent to disrespect the dignity of the human person, which is, in Brazil, the 
foundation of the Republic expressed through the constitutional provision. 
To sum up, although the human rights protection framework from the International 
Human Rights Law is promising, the full realization of these rights still lacks effectiveness because 
it depends on more democratization of international relations and greater undertaking commitment 
by States (oftentimes existent only to the public opinion without been actually applied). Therefore, 
our response to the title of this paper is positive: yes, International Human Rights Law can lead to 
Constitution modification, without this meaning unconstitutionality, on the contrary. 
 
  
                                                          
19 There are, however, issues that need to be considered regarding the applicability of the judicial review, so that the 
actions of the Federal Supreme Court do not become usurpation of the constituent power and violates fundamental 
rights, as noted by ZANOTTI and COURA (2016). 
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CAMILO, Guilherme Vitor de Gonzaga. A aplicação dos tratados e a doutrina do controle de 
convencionalidade: bases jurídicas e efetivação. Revista de Direito Brasileira. v. 17, n. 7, p. 18-39, 
Mai./Ago. 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.rdb.org.br/ojs/index.php/rdb/article/view/428>. Acesso em: 
4 dez. 2017. 
 
DALLARI, Dalmo de Abreu. Elementos de Teoria Geral do Estado. 32a ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2015.  
 
EDELMAN, Bernard. O direito captado pela fotografia – elementos para uma teoria marxista do direito. 
Coimbra: Centelha, 1976.   
 
ENGELS, Friedrich. KAUTSKY, Karl. O socialismo jurídico. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2012. 
 
FERRAJOLI, Luigi. Por uma Teoria dos Direitos e dos Bens Fundamentais. Porto Alegre: Livraria do 
Advogado, 2011.  
 
FROSINI, Justin O. The domestic Law of the United Kingdom and Internacional and European 
Law: An ever more tense relationship. In: MEZZETI, Luca; CONCI, Luiz Guilherme Arcaro 
(Coords.). Diálogo entre cortes: a jurisprudência nacional e internacional como fator de 
aproximação de ordens jurídicas em um mundo cosmopolita. Brasília: OAB, Conselho Federal, 
2015. 
 
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Sobre a constituição da Europa. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2012(a). 
 
HABERMAS, Jürgen. (2012b) The crisis of the European Union. Maldon, MA: Polity Press. 
 
HELD, David. The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed? Disponível em 
<https://www.polity.co.uk/global/pdf/GTReader2eHeld.pdf>, acesso em: 14 nov. 2015.  
 
JULIOS-CAMPUZANO, Alfonso de. Constitucionalismo em tempos de Globalização. Porto Alegre: 
Livraria do Advogado, 2009. 
 
Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals: On a supposed right to lie because of 
philanthropic concerns. Hackett Publishing. 
 
KILLANDER, Magnus. Interpretação dos Tratados Regionais de Direitos Humanos, in Sur. Revista 
Internacional de Direitos Humanos – Rede Universitária de Direitos Humanos, volume 7, número 13 
jun/dez. 2010, pp. 148/175.  
 
Revista de Direito Brasileira | Florianópolis, SC | v. 26 | n. 10 | p. 84-97 | Mai./Ago. 2020 
97 Revista de Direito Brasileira 
 
 
LAFER, Celso A reconstrução dos direitos humanos: um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt. 
São Paulo: Cia das Letras, 1988.  
 
MARX, Karl. Crítica da filosofia do direito de Hegel. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2014.  
 
MAZZUOLI, Valerio de Oliveira. A tese da Supralegalidade dos Tratados de Direitos Humanos. 2009. 
Disponível em: <http://www.lfg.com.br>. Acesso em 01, abr. 2018. 
 
 
MOYN, Samuel. The Future of Human Rights. Sur: Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos – Rede 
Universitária de Direitos Humanos, v. 11, número 20 jun/dez. 2014, pp. 61/69.  
 
NEVES, Marcelo. Entre Têmis e Leviatã: uma relação difícil. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008.  
 
RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Curso de Direitos Humanos. 4ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2017. 
 
RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Curso de Direitos Humanos. 2a ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2015.  
 
RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Processo Internacional de Direitos Humanos. 4a ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 
2015.  
 
RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Teoria Geral dos Direitos Humanos na Ordem Internacional. 5a ed. São 
Paulo: Saraiva, 2015.  
 
SALGUEIRO, Jorge Silvero. Paraguay: diálogo entre Tribunales Nacionales e Internacionales. 
In: MEZZETI, Luca; CONCI, Luiz Guilherme Arcaro (Coords.). Diálogo entre cortes: a 
jurisprudência nacional e internacional como fator de aproximação de ordens jurídicas em um 
mundo cosmopolita. Brasília: OAB, Conselho Federal, 2015. 
 
SIMMONS, Beth. “Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the International Bill 
of Rights” in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16. summer 2009. 
 
ZIIN, Howard. A Young people’s history of the United States. Vol. 2. New York: Seven Stories Press, 
2007.   
 
ZANOTTI, Bruno Taufner; COURA, Alexandre de Castro. Mutação Constitucional e a Ampliação de 
Poderes do (e pelo) poder judiciário: reflexões acerca dos votos dos Ministros Gilmar Mendes e Eros Grau 
na RCL nº 4335. Revista de Direito Brasileira, São Paulo, v. 14, n. 6, maio/ago, 2016. 
 
